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CLASSIFICATION OF SUBTERRANEAN WATERS AND
GENERAL RULE OF LAW GOVERNING EACH.
The law regulating the relative rights of neighboring land
owners with respect to surface waters has been discussed in the
courts for many years and has become well settled at the present
time. The law of subterranean waters, however, is of nich more
recent origin. The first case which distinguished the law in
regard to underground water from that of surface streams seems to
have arisen in Massachusetts in 1836 (G'reenleaf vs. Francis,
18 Pickering, 117) though there were some English cases which
broached the question earlier but were decided on other grounds.
Following this Massachusetts case there was a period of peace in
American courts on that question until 1850 when a Connecticut
case revived the litigation and from that time we have been
acquiring a large amount of judicial authority.
Subterranean waters are divided into two classes; percolating
waters and underground streams (VWillis vs. City of Perry, 60 N. YT.
727). By the term percolating watevs is meant not only those
waters which in the strict sense of the term, percolate through
the soil but also any underjround streams flowing in unknown and
undefined channels. The class called underg:ound streams, on the
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other hand, refers only to such subterranean waters as actually
flow in well defined courses and whose courses are either known
or easily ascertainable.
The reason for this division is that in the first class,
called percolations, the lai.' is directly opposed to that governing
underground streams. In underground streams we find the same rules
controlling as in surface waters. Adjacent proprietors have
relative rights in the water, easements can be created therein
by prescription, and so on through the whole law of underground
and surface watercourses the rules appear to be identical. The
authorities are so numerous and the law so firmly settled on this
point tihat it would be useless to discuss them here. The part
which does give difficulty here is in the borderland cases to
distinguish whether the water in each particular case is of the
one class ot the other.
The fact tlat the water in question flows in a well defined
stream cannot be established by mere theory and speculation but
such facts must be given in evidence as to prove, by reasonable
inference, that such a stream exists. In the casp of Taylor vs.
Welch, 6 Oregon, 198, the court held that the mere fact, when
defendant drained a marsh, a spring on the plaintiff's land, at
a lower level and some 300 feet distant, became dry was not
sufficient to prove that the marsh and spring were connected by a
well defiend stream. In Chase vs. Silverstone, 62 Maine, 175,
defendant in digging a well struck a vein of water which filled
his well and overflowed the yard. The plaintiff's well was thereby
injured but the court held that tlere was no direct proof to
show an underground stream, and that even if they had proved such
a stream it was not known until defendant by excavation had
discovered it and hence was not a stream flowing in a well known
course.
The question as to what constitutes a well known underground
course, so as to brin,- it within the law of surface waters, seems
to give some conflict. It seems to be the better doctrine that
such a streari would not be one whose course was unknown until dis
covered by excavation, but there are authorities holding the other
way. In the case of Haldeman vs. Bruckhardt, 45 Pa. St., 514,
the court held that defined watercourses which cannot be diverted
are not the hidden streams of which the owner of the soil can
have no knowledge until they have been discovered by excavation
made in the exercise of the rights of property, but they are
known streams, the courses of which are perceptible and require
no surface exploration before such courses can be defined. In
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Burroughs vs. Saterlee, 67 Iowa, 396, on the other hand, it was
held that the fact that the stream was not known until the injury
was done was no defence, but that the land owners through whose
lands the stream flows have relative rights in the water.
Vice Chancellor Chaterton, in Black vs. Ballymena, L.R.
17 Irish, 459, states very plainly what knowledge is necessary to
prove a stream sufficiently well defined to make it subject to
the law of surface waters. Ee says: "In considering this question,
the knowled.e required cannot be reasonably held to be that
derived from a discovery in part by excavation exposing the channel
but must be a knowledge, by reasonable inference, from existing
and observed facts in the natural, or rather the pre-existing
condition of the surface of the ground. The onus of proof lies of
course on the plaintiff claiming the right and it lies upon him
to show that, without openin the ground by excavation or having.
recourse to abstruse speculations of scientific persons, men of
ordinary powers and attainments would know, or could by reasonable
diligence ascertain, that the stream, when it emerges into light,
comes from and has flowed through a defined subterranean channel."
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is
that the water in question is percolating Hanson vs. McCue, 42
Cal., 303, Metcalf vs. Nelson, 65 N. W. 911.
CHAPTER II.
RIGHTS IN PERCOLATING WATERS.
Section I.- In General.
II.- How affected by prescription.
III.- How affected by grant.
IV.-Distinction between land owner's rights and rights of
one exercising a special right in the land.
V.- Effect of malice.
Section I.
Rights in general.
Unlike surface waters in which adjoining land owners have
relative rights and can exercise only a reasonable use, percolating
waters, and under this term is included all underground waters
not flowing in well defined courses, are subject to the absolute
dominion of the owner of the land in which such waters are found.
They are treated as a part of the land itself just as much as the
rock, sand or minerals in the earth. As Ames, C. J. says in
Buffom vs. Harris, 5 R. I., 243,"but it (percolating water) is
in the eye of the law, as well as of common sense, the moisture and
a part of the soil with which it intermingles, to be used there
by the owner of the soil if to his advantage, or to be got rid
of in any mode he pleases if to his detriment." And this is the
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well settled view of the matter, the only exception at the present
time being two New Hampshire cases which strenously attack this
position and maintain that relative rights do exist in regard
to percolatiAg waters and that the land owner is entitled to
only a reasonable use of such water. These cases are, Bassett
vs. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 43 N. H., 569, and Swett vs.
Cutts, 50 N. H., 439.
Perhaps the strongest reason for this distinction between
surface and percolating underground waters as to the rights of
land owners is that stated by Bennett, J. in Chatfield vs. Wilson,
28 Vt., 49. He says; "The laws of the existence of water under-
ground., ardi of its progress w-ile there, are not uniform, and
cannot be known with any degree of certainty, nor can its progress
be regulated. It sometimes rises to a great hei,-ht, and sometimes
moves in collateral directions, by some secret influences beyond
our comprehension.
"The secret, changeable, and uncontrolling character of
underground water, in its operations, is so diverse and uncertain
that we cannot well subject it to the regulations of law, nor
build upon it a system of rules as is done in the case of surface
streams. Their nature is defined, and their progress over the
surface may be seen, and known, and is uniform.
7.
"We think the practical uncertainty which must ever attend
subterranean waters is reason enough why it should not be admitted
to subject them to certain and fixed rules of law, and that
it is better to leave them to be enjoyed absolutely by the owner
of the land as one of its natural advantages and in the eye of
the law a part of its"
Another important reason for not allowing neighboring land
owners to possess relative rights in percolating waters is found
in the Indefinate nature and great extent of the obligation which
such a law would impose. A land owner could be restrained from
draining his farm or making any excavations if such act was shown
to interfere with anothers water supply.
Then there is no uniformity in suc;: a rule for a large mining
or quarrying industry could be restrained from carrying on its




In nmny cases involving a question of rights in underground
water the party contending for such a right has based his claim
upon the doctrine of prescription, arguing that a right to a
continued flow of percolating waters through his neighbors land
is an easement capable of being created by grant and equally
capable of being created by a conclusive presumption of a grant
when enjoyed by the claimant for trie period fixed by the local
Statute of Limitations for the acquirement of similar easements
by prescription. A few of the earlier cases were decided in
favor of this view but thiese decisions were not followeu in the
later cases and the universal rule now is that no easement can
be created in percolating waters by prescription.
There are two principle reasons for not allowing an easement
in percolating undergrouind water to be acquired by prescription.
In order to acquire an easement by prescription, as in the case
of acquiring title by adverse possession, there must be an adverse
user. There must be such an assertion of right as to expose
the party to an action unless in fact he had a grant, for, as
Pearson, J. says in Felton vs. Simpson, 11 Iredell (N. Car.) 84,
"it is the fact of his being thus exposed to an action and the
neglect of thne opposite party to bring suit, that is seized upon
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as the ground of presuming a grant, in favor of long possession
and. enjoyment, upon the idea that this adverse state of things
would not have been submitted to, if there had not been a grant."
In percolating waters there exist no relative rights between
neigh boring land owners but each has an absolute right to all
that may be found in his land. Clearly then a person, by using
water which oozes into his land from his neighbors lot, is in no
wise exceeding his rights nor infringing upon the rights of his
neighbor and it wosld be absurd to decide that a continued exercise
of such a right for a long time would raise a presumption that
the owner of the servient estate, who had no right to complain of
the use of the water, had granted an easement to a continued
water supply from his land.
Another necessary element of adverse user is that the user
must be open and notorious. The owner of the servient estate
must know of the use. But in percolating waters their movements
are unknown and uncertain and the person a ainst whom the doctrine
of prescription would be applied camnot be expected to know that
the waters which his neighbor uses filter from his land. As
stated in Frazier vs. Brown, 12 Ohio St., 294, "he could not be
reasonably required to enter his caveat against the appropriation




Although no correlative ri.2hts can be established in percolat-
ing waters by prescription, yet there is no reason why such rights
cannot be obtained by a contractual regulation between the land
owners. Such a grant may arise either by express agreement of
the parties or may be implied. In the case of an express grant
of this nature the diffic Ity exists in thle construction of the
contract to determine the extent of the rights acquired. The
cases of Bliss vs. Greeley, 45 N. Y., 671, and Johnstown Cheese
Mfg. Co. vs. Veghte, 69 1T. Y., 16 furnish good examples of the
general line of distinction which has been followed by the courts
in construeinIg such grants.
In the former case the owner of the farm granted to the
plintiff the right to dig and sto-e up a certain spring and to
conduct the water therefrom through the grantor's land, by a speci-
fied pipe, to the grantees house. The grantee completed the water-
works and enjoyed the use of the ;ater until .he grantor dug a
well near that used by the grantee in consequence of which the
water ceased to rise in the first well and the grantee was deprived
of his water su,-ply. The grantee brought an action a:-ainst the
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grantor for a breach of the grant, but the court held that there
had been no breach. In the opinion Peckham, J. says; "The grant
here is limited and specific. This grant did not make a servient
estate of tha grantors whole farm. It is difficult to see how the
plaintiff acquired more thereby than if he had obtained a grant
in fee of the land, including the spring and the track of the pipe.
Under a jrant in fee it is quite clear that he could have no
relief against the acts found in this case. This grant prevents
the grantor and his assigns from any substantial interference with
the spring or the pipe. It does not prevent their improvement or
use of the residue of the farm. Had the parties designed to make
the whole farm servient to this easement, they should have expresse4
that purpose."
In the case of Johnstown Cheese Co. vs. Veghte, the defendant
granted to the plai~tiff the use of the water whicl was then
conducted to the factory from the springs on the defendants land.
The court distinguished this covenant from that in Bliss vs. Greely
and held that defendant was liable in damages to plaintiff for dig-
ging anyv!here on his land if such acts materially decreased the
flow of water to plaintiffs factory. The intent of the grant was
to secure to the plaintiff all the water then conducted from the
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spring and not simply to give a right to draw what water might
be in the spring.
When the owner of land sells a portion of it he impliedly
grants to the transferee of the land conveyed all the ap:.arent
and visible easements which are necessary for the reasonable use
of the property granted, and which are at the time of the grant
used by the ovner of the entirety for the benefit of the part
granted; but such grantor impliedly reserves such apparent ease-
ments for his own use, as against t.e estate transferred, only
when such an easement is absoluiely necessary to the enjoyment
of the property remaining in the grantor. In other words the law
will imply a grant of an easement in favor of the transferree
of the land more readily than it will imply a reservation in favor
of the transferov. The deed is in the language of the rgrantor
and it is presumed that in druwing such deed he will be less
likely to omit any agreed previsions which are beneficial than
those prejudicial to his interests. The law tr erefore construes
a deed strictly as against the grantor.
In an implied grant the same distinction is observed as to
the extent of the rights granted as in express grants. If
the grant implied is that the flow of the water shall continue as
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before the grant then the grantors entire estate is servient
to such an extent that nothing can be done upon it w.hich wilt
alter the flow of the water. But if the grant only means that
the grantee shall have the right to use a certain well, then
such grantee acquires no greater servitude over the rest of the
estate than of he had bought the land where the well stood and the
grantor would not be liable for excavating near the well and
diverting the water from it.
14.
Section IV.
Distinction between land owner's rights and rights
of one exercising a special right in the land.
It is sometirmes stated that the right to intercept percolat-
ing underground waters is strictly confined to the owner of the
land and that if a person or corporation exercising a special
right in the land should, by diverting such water, injure an
adjoining land owner's water supply he would be liable in damages
at the suit of such injured person. That is too broad a state-
ment of the law and is to a great extent incorrect.
It is universall recognized that the owner of land can grant
away his rights in percolating water and clearly a person acquir-
ing such rights by grant could not be under greater liability
to an adjoining land owner than the grantor himself would be for
similar acts. In the case of a trespasser the question becomes
more difficult. Of course a tuespasser would be liable to the
owner of the land on which he trespassed but weuld he be liable
to an adjoining land owner for injuries caused by diversion of
underground water.
It is a fundamental rule of law that a man is bound to
forsee the natural and probable consequences of his acts and that
any injuries resulting from his acts which an ordinary man would
not foresee as ti:e natural and pro:)able consequence is damnum
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absque injuria. In applying this test to a trespasser's liability
to an adjoining land owner for an injury to his water supply
it might seem that the uncertainty as to the existence and move-
rmnts of underground water would render the injury to an adjoin-
ing land owner too remote to be considered the natural and probable
consequence of his act. This argument would be defeated, however,
by showing that the defendant knew of the movements of the water
when he did the wrong.
Since no relative rights exist between adjacent land owners
it would seem that a person could not control the flow of under-
ground water except while it is actually in his own land and
hence any disturbance of such waters in anothers land could not
give a right of action even as against a trespasser. It is,
however, a close question and as there are no authorities directly
in point it is impossible to determine how the law will be declared
v ien an occasion arises for a decision of this question.
In the case of a public improvement by a municipal corpora-
tion where the statute , authorizing such improvements to be
made, states, that the corporation shall pay full compensation
for all injury to property, the decisions in England and America
seem to differ as to the liability of the corporation for an
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injury to real property, not crossed by the works of the company
but which property is injured by a diversion of under ground
percolating water. In England the courts held that the corpora-
tion would not be liable for such an injury, arguing that the
legislature did. not intend to put the corporation under greater
liability than they would have been without the statute but
simply to confer upon the land ovner a right to compensation
co-extensive with the rights of action of which the statute had
deprived him in authorizing the works, 4ew River Co. vs. Johnson,
2 El. and El., 435. In the American cases of Parker vs. Boston
and Maine Ry. Co., 3 Cushing, 107 and Trowbridge vs. Brookline,
144 Mass., 139, the same question arose under similar statutes
and the courts held that the statute included any real and actual
damage and that an injury to a well by a disturbance of the




There are numerous cases in which the question of the effect
of malice in appropriating or diverting underground percolating
water has been presented to the courts. Vhile there are marw
opinions which touch this point, some of them very extensively,
yet in the great majority of the cases the remarks are mere
dicta and so of little force as authorities.
In the case of Shesley vs. King, 74 Maine, 164, a very exten-
sive discussion of this question is given by Barrows, J. in which
he maintains that willful, malicious injury to another is punish-
able even though the same act if done from good motives would be
damnun absque injuria. He says, " one of the legal rights of
every one in a civilized community wouLld seem to be security in the
possession of his property and. privileges against purely wanton
and needless attacks from those whose- hostility he may have in
some way incurred." There are many dicta which support this
view but there seem to be no cases which actually turned on this
point that were decided in this way. The greater weight of
authoritl, seems to be in accord with the following rule, as laid
down by Black, J. in Jenkins vs. Fowler, 24 Pa. St., 308.
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"Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make
that a wrong, which in its own essence is lawful." In the case
of Phelps vs. Nowlen, 72 No Y., 39, the question was squarely
before the court and it was decided that malicious motives in
the exercise of a legal right would not give rise to a cause of
action. In reviewing the previous N. Y. cases Miller, J. says,
"These cases tend to establish the doctrine in this State, that
if a man has a legal right courts will not inquire into the
motive by which he is actuated in enforceing the same. A differ-
ent rule would lead to the encouragement of litigation and prevent
in many instances a complete and full enjoyment of the right
of property which inheres to the owner of the soil."
19.
CHAPTER III.
POLLUTION OF UNDERGROUND WATER.
Having now considered some of the different questions which
have arisen in regard to rig:ts to appropriate or divert under-
ground water, the subject of contamination or pollution of such
waters presents itself. In this branch of the law of underg~omd
waters the conflict of the authorities is most noticeable. The
practical importance of the questions involved in this branch of
the law is perhaps greater than in any other part of the law of
subterranean waters and, owin; to this importance and to the
conflict of' authorities upon the subject, the litigation is here
observed to be most extensive. Several doctrines have been
presented as a solution of the difficulty. Some courts looking
at the mere legal right of ownership nf the waters in the owner
of the land. have laid down the rule that such ownership includes
the right to use the waters in any way in which the owner desires.
Most of the co rts, however, adopt a more equitable view and
refuse to the land owner the right to pillute the undergroind
water which his neighbor is entitled to receive in its pure state.
The doctrine laid down in Upjohn vs. Richland Township,
46 Mich., 542 is rather an extreme view of the case and is not
sanctioned by any large number of cases. In that case 6ooley, J.
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says "But if withdrawing the water from ones well by an excavation
on adjoining lands will give no right of action, it is difficult
to understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of the
adjoining premises can be actionable, when there is no actual
intent to injure, and no negligence. The one act destroys the
well, and the other does no more; the injury is the same in kind
and degree in the two cases." This idea rests on the principle
that tne owner of the land is absolute owner of the water in it
and hence can use it as he pleases while it is in his land. That
would be a simple rule to lay down an, apply but obviously it is
far from being a just one. One of the fundamental rules or maxims
of our law is, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, and certainly
to allow a person to poison the water on his land and then allow
it to pass to his neighbor would be a serious infraction of that
maxim.
A much more just view is taken by the majority of the courts.
It bases its doctrine rather on the law of nuisance than of
property rights. Prima facie a land owner is not allowed to
cause his own property to become a nuisance to his neighbor and
it is immaterial whether such nuisance is the result of putting
filth on ones land or on his own land and allowing it to escape
to his neighbor's or by poisoning the air whic-, his neighbor
21.
breathes or the water he drinks. The case of Ballard vs. Tomlinson
29 Ch. Div., 125 is a leading case in support of this doctrine.
In the opinion Lindley, L. J. says, "So if a man choose to poison
his own well, he must take care not to poison the waters which
other persons have a right to use as much as himself. To hold
the contrary, on the ground that the water is not their property
until they get it, is to take an inadequate view of the subject
and to overlook the fact that the law of nuisance is not based
exclusively on rights of property."
Mr. Edmund. Bennett, in an article in 24 Am. Law Reg., 638,
gives a very logical doctrine, following the theory generally
known as the doctrine of Rylands vs. Fletcher. He says, "The
ground of liability in all such cases is obvious and simple, and
if' the principle be kept steadily in mind it will lead to a
satisfactory conclusion in them all. That principle is that
every man is bound to keep all his dangerous things on his own
premises at his peril; and if he fails to do so, and they escape
and injure others, he is liable."

